Team and noncooperative solutions to access control with priorities
Name
Altaian-2009-Team and noncooperative solutions to access control with priorities.pdf
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220.75 KB
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Author(s) • •
Suárez, Alberto
Altman, Eitan
Menache, Ishai
Date Issued
April 2009
Journal
IEEE INFOCOM 2009
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Citation
Altman, E., I. Menache, and A. Suarez. “Team and Noncooperative Solutions to Access Control with Priorities.” INFOCOM 2009, IEEE. 2009. 1611-1619. © 2009 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We consider decentralized medium-access control in which many pairwise interactions occur between randomly selected users that belong to a large population. In each local interaction, the users involved compete over an access opportunity. A given user has a fixed number of access attempts and a fixed budget for buying different priority levels. In each time-slot, the access is attributed to the user with the largest priority level. We analyze this problem under both cooperative as well as competitive frameworks. We show that unlike many standard team problems, optimal pure policies do not exist in the team framework, but both an optimal solution as well as equilibria exist within the class of mixed policies. We establish structural properties as well as explicit characterization of these: We show that the optimal policy requires only three priority levels, whereas the noncooperative game possesses a unique symmetric equilibrium point that uses at most two priority levels. Our analysis is applied to power control over wireless capture channels, where the budget constraint corresponds to the battery lifetime.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2009.5062079