Gains to producers from the cartelization of exhaustible resources
Name
MIT-EL-76-012WP-03804475.pdf
Size
2.02 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
b736f9b84a3ec9167897ca2cffded063
Author(s)
Pindyck, Robert S.
Date Issued
1976
Publisher
MIT Energy Lab
Series/Report no.
MIT-EL
76-012WP
Abstract
The potential gains to producers from the cartelization of the world
petroleum, copper, and bauxite markets are calculated under the
assumption of optimal dynamic monopoly pricing of an exhaustible
resource. Small quantitative models for the markets for each resource
are developed that account for short-term lag adjustments in demand
and supply as well as long-term resource depletion. Potential gains
from the cartelization of each resource are measured by calculating
optimal price trajectories under competition and under cartelization,
and comparing the sums of discounted profits resulting from each.
Description
Prepared in association with the Sloan School of Management and the Dept. of Economics
Subjects
Trusts, Industrial
Persistent DSpace Link
