The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia’s False Positives
Name
pol.20180168.pdf
Description
Published version
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912.73 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
7a96ad55e22814081355804e09661c03
Author(s)
Acemoglu, K. Daron
Date Issued
August 2020
Journal
AEJ: Economic Policy
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron et al. “The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia’s False Positives.” AEJ: Economic Policy, 12, 3 (August 2020): 1-43 © 2020 The Author(s)
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We investigate the use of high-powered incentives for the Colombian military and show that this practice produced perverse side effects. Innocent civilians were killed and misrepresented as guerillas (a phenomenon known in Colombia as "false positives"). There were significantly more false positives during the period of high-powered incentives in municipalities with weaker judicial institutions and where a higher share of brigades were commanded by colonels, who have stronger career concerns than generals. In municipalities with a higher share of colonels, the high-powered incentives period also coincided with a worsening of local judicial institutions and no discernible improvement in overall security.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/POL.20180168
