Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks
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Acemoglu_Opinion dynamics.pdf
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364.19 KB
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Author(s)
Acemoglu, Daron
Ozdaglar, Asuman E.
Date Issued
August 2010
Journal
Dynamic Games and Applications
Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron and Asuman Ozdaglar. "Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks." Dynamic Games and Applications, 1.1 (March 2011) : p.3-49.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We provide an overview of recent research on belief and opinion dynamics in social
networks. We discuss both Bayesian and non-Bayesian models of social learning and
focus on the implications of the form of learning (e.g., Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian),
the sources of information (e.g., observation vs. communication), and the structure of
social networks in which individuals are situated on three key questions: (1) whether
social learning will lead to consensus, i.e., to agreement among individuals starting with
diff erent views; (2) whether social learning will effectively aggregate dispersed information
and thus weed out incorrect beliefs; (3) whether media sources, prominent agents,
politicians and the state will be able to manipulate beliefs and spread misinformation
in a society.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
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DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-010-0004-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-010-0004-1
