Audit quality and performance evaluation : an analysis of the US credit union industry
Name
46824356-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
12.5 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
10de38978500b280b225f6b316f279c9
Author(s)
Keating, Elizabeth Krahmer, 1959-
Advisor(s)
Paul M. Healy.
Alternative Title
Analysis of the US credit union industry
Date Issued
2000
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
The first paper examines the determinants of credit unions' audit quality choice and the implications of this choice on financial statement management and financial distress. Credit unions provide a setting with large variation in audit quality, ranging from a "self audit" to an independent CPA audit. I find credit unions select higher audit quality if faced with higher business risk, size and agency costs. Audit quality is inversely associated with the probability of earnings management but is not associated with other forms of financial statement management. However, audit quality is not associated with an increased likelihood of financial distress or failure. My findings suggest that other forms of monitoring, such as regulatory examinations, may substitute for low audit quality. Accordingly, mandating higher audit quality alone may not have a substantial effect on the quality of reported financial results or the likelihood of financial distress. The second paper examines performance evaluation in the credit union setting. Using data from a moderate-sized credit union, the essay employs a case-study approach to examine the role of annual budgeting, pricing of services, and compensation.
Description
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2000.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-92).
Subjects
Sloan School of Management.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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