Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
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Pathak_Matching with.pdf
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716.62 KB
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Author(s)
Pathak, Parag
Kojima, Fuhito
Roth, Alvin E.
Date Issued
July 2013
Journal
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Citation
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. “Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 4 (July 16, 2013): 1585–1632.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article’s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are sufficiently short relative to market size. We also discuss incentives in markets with couples. We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of couples.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt019
