A systematic analysis of defenses against code reuse attacks
Name
870309696-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
4.37 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
89560010f8243beb9203b3ee4ffaed4d
Author(s)
Casteel, Kelly (Kelly C.)
Advisor(s)
Hamed Okhravi and Nickolai Zeldovich.
Date Issued
2013
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this thesis, we developed a systematic model of the code reuse attack space where facts about attacks and defenses were represented as propositional statements in boolean logic and the possibility of deploying malware was a satisfiability instance. We use the model to analyze the space in two ways: we analyze the defense configurations of a real-world system and we reason about hypothetical defense bypasses. We construct attacks based on the hypothetical defense bypasses. Next, we investigate the control flow graphs enforced by proposed control flow integrity (CFI) systems. We model the behavior of these systems using a graph search. We also develop several code reuse payloads that work within the control flow graph enforced by one proposed CFI defense. Our findings illustrate that the defenses we investigated are not effective in preventing real world attacks.
Description
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 85-88).
Subjects
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Terms of Use
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