Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry
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borenstein.rose.jpe.1994.pdf
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1.99 MB
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Adobe PDF
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8ef50dd2b15260b950653d264f511650
Author(s) •
Borenstein, Severin
Rose, Nancy L
Date Issued
August 1994
Journal
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Borenstein, Severin, and Rose, Nancy L. “Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry.” Journal of Political Economy 102, 4 (August 1994): 653–683 © 1994 University of Chicago
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We study dispersion in the prices an airline charges to different passengers on the same route. This variation in fares is substantial: the expected absolute difference in fares between two passengers on a route is 36 percent of the airline's average ticket price. The pattern of observed price dispersion cannot easily be explained by cost differences alone. Dispersion increases on routes with more competition or lower flight density, consistent with discrimination based on customers' willingness to switch to alternative airlines or flights. We argue that the data support models of price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Humanities
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1086/261950