Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment
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mic.20180317.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
739.98 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
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Author(s) •
Fudenberg, Drew
Vespa, Emanuel
Date Issued
November 2019
Journal
AEJ: Macroeconomics
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Fudenberg, Drew and Emanuel Vespa. “Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment.” AEJ: Macroeconomics, 11, 4 (November 2020): 186-215 © 2020 The Author(s)
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned once-and-for-all, and feedback is type specific. The theory of learning in games predicts that the non-Nash but self-confirming equilibrium where some fraction of types play Out can persist in the fixed-type treatment but not when types are i.i.d. Our results confirm that more senders do play Out in the fixed-type treatment. (JEL C92, D82, D83)
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20180317