Improving security at the system-call boundary in a type-safe operating system
Name
1102057671-MIT.pdf
Size
898.3 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
414d7f5a206f116ce92814fa077a318f
Author(s)
Weisblat, Jakob H.
Advisor(s)
Howard Shrobe, Hamed Okhravi and Bryan Ward.
Date Issued
2019
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Historically, most approaches to operating sytems security aim to either protect the kernel (e.g., the MMU) or protect user applications (e.g., W [symbol] X). However, little study has been done into protecting the boundary between these layers. We describe a vulnerability in Tock, a type-safe operating system, at the system-call boundary. We then introduce a technique for providing memory safety at the boundary between userland and the kernel in Tock. We demonstrate that this technique works to prevent against the aforementioned vulnerability and a class of similar vulnerabilities, and we propose how it might be used to protect against simliar vulnerabilities in other operating systems.
Description
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2019
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 44-50).
Subjects
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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