In defense of moral testimony
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11098_2012_Article_9887.pdf
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193.82 KB
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Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
866f8a1af59f835593c6f2907e1e3a49
Author(s)
Sliwa, Pauline A.
Date Issued
March 2012
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Sliwa, Paulina. “In Defense of Moral Testimony.” Philosophical Studies 158, no. 2 (March 2012): 175–195. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9887-6.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Moral testimony has been getting a bad name in the recent literature. It has been argued that while testimony is a perfectly fine source for nonmoral belief, there’s something wrong with basing one’s moral beliefs on it. This paper argues that the bad name is undeserved: Moral testimony isn’t any more problematic than nonmoral testimony.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9887-6
