Policy Analysis in Matching Markets
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aer.p20171112.pdf
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459.73 KB
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Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Agarwal, Nikhil
Date Issued
May 2017
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Agarwal, Nikhil. “Policy Analysis in Matching Markets.” American Economic Review, vol. 107, no. 5, May 2017, pp. 246–50.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Price and quantity interventions intended to affect assignments are common in many labor and education markets (e.g., financial aid, quotas). This article discusses an empirical framework, based on the theory of stable matching, that is suitable for policy analysis while accounting for the presence of equilibrium sorting. It then compares financial incentives and supply interventions for encouraging the training of family medicine residents in rural America. Due to equilibrium effects, the primary effect of financial incentives is to increase the quality, not numbers, of residents in rural programs, while quantity regulations directly affect numbers without adversely affecting quality.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.P20171112
