Analysis of return oriented programming and countermeasures
Name
1031984780-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
4.59 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
2005fb69ba4ebd08717e8a7395e80d48
Author(s)
Soderstrom, Eric K
Advisor(s)
Martin Rinard and Hamed Okhravi.
Date Issued
2014
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Introduction: Attackers have relatively success in defeating modern defensive techniques by using an exploitation method known as "code reuse." This class of exploitation techniques makes use of the lack of memory safety in C which allows an attacker to redirect a program's control flow to pre-existing snippets of code. Code reuse attacks have historically been a powerful and ubiquitous exploitation technique [2]. Even as recently as 2014 there has been an outbreak of these code reuse attacks, targeting such applications as Adobe, Internet Explorer, and Firefox 15]. Many defensive countermeasures have been taken by the security community, ranging from data execution prevention to varying degrees of code randomization. This thesis can roughly be broken into two halves: 1. Show how code reuse attacks can leverage timing information in order to break many existing defenses. 2. Investigate how control flow integrity can be improved upon as a countermeasure to code reuse attacks ...
Description
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2014.
Missing pages 3 and 4 (abstract). Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 63-65).
Subjects
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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