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Epistemic Contradictions Do Not Threaten Classical Logic
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12136_2021_Article_506.pdf
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570.87 KB
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Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Mayr, Philipp
Date Issued
February 2022
Journal
Acta Analytica
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Citation
Mayr, Philipp. 2022. "Epistemic Contradictions Do Not Threaten Classical Logic."
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Abstract
Epistemic contradictions are now a well-known and often discussed phenomenon among those who study epistemic modals. These contradictions are expressed by sentences like ‘It is raining and it might not be raining’ whose oddness to the common ear demands an explanation. However, it has turned out to be a rather controversial enterprise to provide such an explanation in a sufficiently precise and general manner. According to pragmatic explanations, epistemic contradictions are semantically consistent but pragmatically defective. According to semantic explanations, one should regard epistemic contradictions as plain semantic inconsistencies. Endorsing such a semantic solution is, however, tantamount to rejecting classical logic, which predicts the consistency of epistemic contradictions. After arguing that all existing solutions to this problem face as yet unmet challenges, I will present a new solution that adequately overcomes these challenges. I will propose to view epistemic contradictions as semantically consistent but epistemically defective sentences. The main thesis emerging will be that we need neither abandon the inference rules of classical logic nor the classical truth-conditional approach to semantics to deal adequately with epistemic contradictions.
Subjects
Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00506-9
