Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings
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MakingMovesMatter.pdf
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Author(s)
Khan, Adnan Q.
Khwaja, Asim Ijaz
Olken, Benjamin
Date Issued
January 2019
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Khan, Adnan Q. et al. "Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings." American Economic Review 109, 1 (January 2019): 237-270
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30–41 percent. Inspectors that our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180277
