How individual preferences are aggregated in groups: An experimental study
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Pathak_How individual.pdf
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345.91 KB
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Author(s)
Ambrus, Attila
Greiner, Ben
Pathak, Parag
Date Issued
June 2015
Journal
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Citation
Ambrus, Attila et al. “How Individual Preferences Are Aggregated in Groups: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Public Economics 129 (September 2015): 1–13 © 2015 Elsevier B.V.
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates how individual preferences, through unrestricted deliberation, are aggregated into a group decision in two contexts: reciprocating gifts and choosing between lotteries. In both contexts, we find that median group members have a significant impact on the group decision, but the median is not the only influential group member. Non-median members closer to the median tend to have more influence than other members. By investigating the same individual's influence in different groups, we find evidence for relative position in the group having a direct effect on influence. These results are consistent with predictions from spatial models of dynamic bargaining, for members with intermediate levels of patience. We also find that group deliberation involves bargaining and compromise as well as persuasion: preferences tend to shift towards the choice of the individual's previous group, especially for those with extreme individual preferences. Keywords: Group decision-making; Role of deliberation; Social influence
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2015.05.008
