Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
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Pathak_Strategy-proofness.pdf
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268.87 KB
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Author(s)
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila
Pathak, Parag
Roth, Alvin E.
Date Issued
December 2009
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review, 99(5): 1954–78.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
