Simultaneous Ad Auctions
Name
Ashlagi_Simultaneous Ad.pdf
Size
354.79 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
04c89405f02b1c9d2881465db555bb2d
Author(s)
Ashlagi, Itai
Monderer, Dov
Tennenholtz, Moshe
Date Issued
February 2011
Journal
Mathematics of Operations Research
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Citation
Ashlagi, I., D. Monderer, and M. Tennenholtz. “Simultaneous Ad Auctions.” Mathematics of Operations Research 36.1 (2011): 1–13. Web.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0475
