Justifying Bayesianism
Name
868024606-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
4.63 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
f814dcfb920f5d76038d85528c015a33
Author(s)
Carr, Jennifer Rose
Advisor(s)
Richard Holton.
Date Issued
2013
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Bayesianism, in its traditional form, consists of two claims about rational credences. According to the first claim, probabilism, rational credences form a probability function. According to the second claim, conditionalization, rational credences update by conditionalizing on new evidence. The simplicity and elegance of classical Bayesianism make it an attractive view. But many have argued that this simplicity comes at a cost: that it requires too many idealizations. This thesis aims to provide a justification of classical Bayesianism. Chapter One defends probabilism, classically understood, against the charge that by requiring credences to be precise real numbers, classical Bayesianism is committed to an overly precise conception of evidence. Chapter Two defends conditionalization, classically understood, against the charge that epistemic rationality consists only of synchronic norms. Chapter Three defends both probabilism and conditionalization against the objection that they require us, in some circumstances, to have credences that we can know are not as close to the truth as alternatives that violate Bayesian norms.
Description
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2013.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 97-100).
Subjects
Linguistics and Philosophy.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
M.I.T. theses are protected by
copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but
reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written
permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but
reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written
permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Persistent DSpace Link
