The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: Evidence from Angel Financings
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Schoar_The consequences.pdf
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596.93 KB
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c76fa24e40b1a7ccfca9017b91a2a225
Author(s)
Kerr, William R.
Lerner, Josh
Schoar, Antoinette
Date Issued
October 2011
Journal
Review of Financial Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies
Citation
Kerr, W. R., J. Lerner, and A. Schoar. “The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: Evidence from Angel Financings.” Review of Financial Studies 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 20–55.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
This article documents the fact that ventures funded by two successful angel groups experience superior outcomes to rejected ventures: They have improved survival, exits, employment, patenting, Web traffic, and financing. We use strong discontinuities in angel- funding behavior over small changes in their collective interest levels to implement a regression discontinuity approach. We confirm the positive effects for venture operations, with qualitative support for a higher likelihood of successful exits. On the other hand, there is no difference in access to additional financing around the discontinuity. This might suggest that financing is not a central input of angel groups.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr098
