Invariance to representation of information
Name
Invariance to Representation of Information.pdf
Size
269.25 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Yildiz, Muhamet
Date Issued
October 2015
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
Yildiz, Muhamet. “Invariance to Representation of Information.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 94, Nov. 2015, pp. 142–56.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Under weak assumptions on the solution concept, I construct an invariant selection across all finite type spaces, in which the types with identical information play the same action. Along the way, I establish an interesting lattice structure for finite type spaces and construct an equilibrium on the space of all finite types. Keywords: invariant selection, invariance, equilibrium, universal type space
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.09.004
