Price discrimination and patent policy
Name
MIT-EL-88-007WP-19524104.pdf
Size
1.53 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
33310398a05013ebb4df5fc461f98f53
Author(s)
Hausman, Jerry A.
MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
Date Issued
1988
Publisher
MIT Energy Lab
Series/Report no.
MIT-EL
88-007WP
Abstract
Patent and antitrust policy are often presumed to be in conflict. As an
important example, there is ongoing controversy about whether price discrimination by a
patent holder is an illegal or socially undesirable exploitation of monopoly power. In this
article. we show that no conflict exists in many price discrimination cases. Even ignoring
the (dynamic) effects on incentives for innovation, third-degree price discrimination by
patent holders can raise (static) social welfare. In fact, Pareto improvements may well
occur. Welfare gains occur because price discrimination allows patent holders: (a) to open
new markets and (b) to achieve economies of scale or learning. Further, even in cases where
discrimination incurs static welfare losses, it may be efficient relative to other mechanisms,
such as length of patent life, for rewarding innovators with profits.
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