Social Learning Equilibria
Name
1207.5895.pdf
Description
Submitted version
Size
425.54 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
945020da6e1d938ff15e5024bea00858
Author(s)
Mossel, Elchanan
Mueller-Frank, Manuel
Sly, Allan
Tamuz, Omer
Date Issued
2020
Journal
Econometrica
Publisher
The Econometric Society
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
© 2020 The Econometric Society We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, observe private signals, and interact in a general dynamic setting. We introduce social learning equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given extensive form, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish general conditions for agreement, herding, and information aggregation in equilibrium, highlighting a connection between agreement and information aggregation.
MIT Department
Statistics and Data Science Center (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16465
