Congestion pricing using a raffle-based scheme
Name
Amin_Congestion pricing.pdf
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262.85 KB
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Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Amin, Saurabh
Loiseau, Patrick
Schwartz, Galina
Musacchio, John
Sastry, S. Shankar
Date Issued
December 2011
Journal
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization (NetGCooP), 2011
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Citation
Loiseau, Patrick et al. "Congestion pricing using a raffle-based scheme." Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization (NetGCooP) (2011): 1-8.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We propose a raffle-based scheme for the decongestion of a shared resource. Our scheme builds on ideas from the economic literature on incentivizing contributions to a public good. We formulate a game-theoretic model for the decongestion problem in a setup with a finite number of users, as well as in a setup with an infinite number of non-atomic users. We analyze both setups, and show that the former converges toward the latter when the number of users becomes large. We compare our results to existing results for the public good provision problem. Overall, our results establish that raffle-based schemes are useful in addressing congestion problems.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?reload=true&arnumber=6103873&contentType=Conference+Publications
