14.11 Insights from Game Theory into Social Behavior, Fall 2013
Author(s)
Hoffman, Moshe
Yoeli, Erez
Alternative Title
Insights from Game Theory into Social Behavior
Date Issued
December 2013
Abstract
We will apply insights from game theory to explain human social behavior, focusing on novel applications which have heretofore been the realm of psychologists and philosophers—for example, why people speak indirectly, in what sense beauty is socially constructed, and where our moral intuitions come from—and eschewing traditional economic applications such as industrial organization or auctions. We will employ standard games such as the prisoners dilemma, coordination, hawk-dove, and costly signaling, and use standard game theory tools such as Nash Equilibria, Subgame Perfection, and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. These tools will be taught from scratch and no existing knowledge of game theory, economics, or mathematics is required. At the same time, students familiar with these games and tools will not find the course redundant because of the focus on non-orthodox applications.
Subjects
game theory
social behavior
prisoners' dilemma
hawk-dove
costly signaling
Nash Equilibria
Subgame Perfection
Pefect Bayesian Equilibria
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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