Repository logo
Log in(current)
Repository logoMIT Open ScholarshipDSpace@MIT
  1. Home
  2. MIT Open Access Articles
  3. MIT Open Access Articles
  4. Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio

Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio

Thumbnail Image
Download
Name

Murray_Funding scientific.pdf

Size

881.54 KB

Format

Adobe PDF

Checksum (MD5)

0fec21def50a67ec1a32ffc0a4bfa144

Author(s)
Gans, Joshua Samuel
•
Murray, Fiona E.
Date Issued
March 2012
Journal
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited (2012)
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Gans, Joshua S. and Fiona Murray. "Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure and the Public-Private Portfolio." Chapter in NBER book The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited (2012), Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, editors. University of Chicago Press (March 2012). p. 51-103.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
This paper examines argues that while two distinct perspectives characterize the foundations of the public funding of research – filling a selection gap and solving a disclosure problem – in fact both the selection choices of public funders and their criteria for disclosure and commercialization shape the level and type of funding for research and the disclosures that arise as a consequence. In making our argument, we begin by reviewing project selection criteria and policies towards disclosure and commercialization (including patent rights) made by major funding organizations, noting the great variation between these institutions. We then provide a model of how selection criteria and funding conditions imposed by funders interact with the preferences of scientists to shape those projects that accept public funds and the overall level of openness in research. Our analysis reveals complex and unexpected relationships between public funding, private funding, and public disclosure of research. We show, for example, that funding choices made by public agencies can lead to unintended, paradoxical effects, providing short-term openness while stifling longer-term innovation. Implications for empirical evaluation and an agenda for future research are discussed.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Persistent DSpace Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88015
DOI of Published Version
http://fmurray.scripts.mit.edu/docs/GansMurray_Ch1_NBERRateDirection2012.pdf
Repository logo
PrivacyPermissionsAccessibilityContact us
Repository logo
Notify us about copyright concerns.