Reasons for Non-Agents
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RAJP_A_2521027_O.pdf
Size
411.97 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
7024f92a702d709e1f9e7b52b5253f37
Author(s)
Watkins, Eliot
Date Issued
September 16, 2024
Journal
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Citation
Watkins, E. (2025). Reasons for Non-Agents. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1–17.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
According to a standard picture, normative reasons do not extend beyond the boundaries of agency. If something isn’t an agent, then there can’t be normative reasons for it to do one thing rather than another. This paper argues that the standard picture is false. There are reasons for smoke detectors to alarm when exposed to smoke, and for Venus Flytraps to close around their prey when stimulated. I argue that the collapse of the standard picture has important implications for philosophical debates about reasons, and especially serious consequences for theories that analyse normative reasons in terms of the standards of good practical reasoning.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2025.2521027
