Integration and corporate investment
Name
50650062-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
8.74 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
23925467330d235e5e6b2335ca517286
Author(s)
Ozbas, Oguzhan, 1971-
Advisor(s)
David S. Scharfstein.
Date Issued
2002
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that broadly investigates, theoretically and empirically, the effect of firm boundaries and organizational processes on internal resource allocation and corporate investment. In the first chapter, I develop an equilibrium model of internal competition for corporate resources and show that managers of integrated firms exaggerate the quality of their projects to get funding. Moreover, I show that the problem gets worse with increased integration and puts an endogenous limit on the amount of value-enhancing redistribution that can be achieved in an integrated firm. I then argue that the control rights that come with asset ownership enable a firm to set "the rules of the game" and mitigate negative managerial behavior through organizational processes such as rigid capital budgets, job rotation, centralization and hierarchies. These results point to a comparative advantage that a firm has over other financial intermediaries in allocating resources. In the second chapter, I empirically explore the effect of integration on the allocation of resources. Specifically, I find that integrated firms use stale information in their investment decisions. In addition, they have more rigid capital budgets and consequently are less responsive to investment opportunities than non-integrated firms. Using a novel approach to identify related segments, I find that the effects are stronger for diversified integrated firms that are engaged in unrelated lines of business. These empirical findings lend support to the theory developed in Chapter 1.
(cont.) In the third chapter, I take a case study approach and analyze the investment behavior of nonoil segments of oil companies from 1980 to 1995. I find that oil companies reduced their nonoil investments prior to the 1986 oil shock. I also perform a number of robustness checks and find that the reductions immediately after the oil shock, contrary to earlier research, do not pass conventional levels of statistical significance. A comprehensive dataset of U.S. petrochemical plants provides independent evidence confirming these findings. Finally, I find that oil companies reduced their nonoil investments in 1992 despite a positive shock to oil prices following the Gulf War. I suggest several conjectures to explain the unexpected reduction and discuss potential avenues for further research.
Description
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references.
Subjects
Sloan School of Management.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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