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All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits

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Author(s)
Kang, Benjamin
•
Unwin, James
Date Issued
January 9, 2026
Journal
Games
Publisher
Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
Citation
Kang, Benjamin, and James Unwin. 2026. "All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits" Games 17, no. 1: 2.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here, we consider a number of alternative forfeits that might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Persistent DSpace Link
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/164983
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010002
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