The ultra-thin conception of objecthood
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SINQ_A_2466700_O.pdf
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1.56 MB
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Adobe PDF
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Author(s)
Rayo, Agustin
Date Issued
March 2, 2025
Journal
An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Citation
Rayo, A. (2025). The ultra-thin conception of objecthood. Inquiry, 1–23.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
In his excellent book Thin Objects, Øystein Linnebo develops a conception of
objecthood that allows for thin objects: objects whose ‘existence does not
make a substantial demand on the world’ (p. 4). His proposal is premised on
the Fregean dictum that to be an object is to be the referent of a possible
singular term (p. 22). As a result, much of Linnebo’s argumentation is focused
on defending a ‘thin’ conception of reference, which is liberal enough to
allow for thin objects. This paper is a critique of Linnebo’s conception of
reference.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2025.2466700
