Determinants of the Informativeness of Analyst Research
Name
Determinants of the Informativeness 4243-02.pdf
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Author(s)
Frankel, Richard M.
Kothari, S.P.
Weber, Joseph
Date Issued
June 7, 2002
Series/Report no.
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4243-02
Abstract
Analyst research helps prices reflect information about a security's fundamentals.
However, analysts' private incentives potentially contribute to misleading research and
it is possible that the market fixates on such misleading and/or optimistic reports. We
examine cross-sectional determinants of the informativeness of analyst reports, i.e.,
their effect on security prices, controlling for endogeneity among the factors affecting
informativeness. Analysts are more informative when the potential brokerage profits
are higher (e.g., high trading volume and high volatility) and when they reveal "bad
news." Analyst informativeness is reduced in circumstances of increased information
processing costs. We fail to find evidence that informativeness of analyst reports is due
to market's fixation or over- or under-reaction to analyst reports.
Subjects
Analyst Forcast
Forecast
Analyst
Market Effieiency
Earnings Forecast
Informativeness
Persistent DSpace Link
