Building biosecurity for synthetic biology
Name
msb.20209723.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
368.93 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
38d035eba9587eba867b3fa3fe73a6a1
Author(s)
Trump, Benjamin D
Galaitsi, SE
Appleton, Evan
Bleijs, Diederik A
Florin, Marie-Valentine
Gollihar, Jimmy D
Hamilton, R Alexander
Kuiken, Todd
Lentzos, Filippa
Mampuys, Ruth
Date Issued
2020
Journal
Molecular Systems Biology
Publisher
EMBO
Citation
Trump, Benjamin D, Galaitsi, SE, Appleton, Evan, Bleijs, Diederik A, Florin, Marie-Valentine et al. 2020. "Building biosecurity for synthetic biology." Molecular Systems Biology, 16 (7).
Version
Final published version
Abstract
© 2020 The Authors. Published under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Institute for Data, Systems, and Society
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.15252/MSB.20209723
