Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism
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disagreement_and_attitudinal_relativism_narrow.pdf
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266.91 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
8e3bcba41e2b2bd785cbd47aea5955ea
Author(s)
Spencer II, John Haven
Date Issued
April 2016
Journal
Mind
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Citation
Spencer, Jack. “Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism.” Mind 125.498 (2016): 511–539.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder (2013) argue that invariantist accounts of disagreement are incompatible with the phenomenon of reversibility. In this essay I develop a non-standard theory of propositional attitudes, which I call attitudinal relativism. Using the resources of attitudinal relativism, I articulate an invariantist account of disagreement that is compatible with reversibility.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv150
