Did English generators play cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool
Name
2004-010.pdf
Size
402.69 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
fa6ac3d260ca3b8eca008ae4c699b71c
Author(s)
Green, Richard
Date Issued
2004
Publisher
MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Series/Report no.
MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 04-010WP.
Abstract
Electricity generators can raise the price of power by withholding their plant from the market. We discuss two ways in which this could have affected prices in the England and Wales Pool. Withholding low-cost capacity which should be generating will raise energy prices but make the pattern of generation less efficient. This pattern improved significantly after privatisation. Withholding capacity that was not expected to generate would raise the Capacity Payments based on spare capacity. On a multi-year basis, these did not usually exceed ₃competitive₄ levels, the cost of keeping stations open. The evidence for large-scale capacity withholding is weak.
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