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  4. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns : theory and evidence

Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns : theory and evidence

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optimalincentive00gibb.pdf

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Author(s)
Gibbons, Robert
•
Murphy, Kevin James
Date Issued
1990
Publisher
Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Series/Report no.
Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 563
Persistent DSpace Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63927
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