Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads
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Author(s)
Kemp, R. Scott
Danagoulian, Areg
Macdonald, Ruaridh R.
Vavrek, Jayson Robert
Date Issued
August 2016
Journal
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences (U.S.)
Citation
Kemp, R. Scott et al. “Physical Cryptographic Verification of Nuclear Warheads.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, 31 (July 2016): 8618–8623 © 2016 National Academy of Sciences
Version
Final published version
Abstract
How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times. Keywords: isotopic tomography; nuclear weapons; disarmament; verification
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1073/PNAS.1603916113
