Modeling Airline Frequency Competition for Airport Congestion Mitigation
Name
Barnhart_Modeling airline.pdf
Size
708.18 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
f51e583c3e4cde17a6baaad8a3a3c128
Author(s)
Vaze, Vikrant
Barnhart, Cynthia
Date Issued
May 2012
Journal
Transportation Science
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Citation
Vaze, V., and C. Barnhart. “Modeling Airline Frequency Competition for Airport Congestion Mitigation.” Transportation Science 46.4 (2012): 512–535.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Demand often exceeds capacity at congested airports. Airline frequency competition is partially responsible for the growing demand for airport resources. We propose a game-theoretic model for airline frequency competition under slot constraints. The model is solved to obtain a Nash equilibrium using a successive optimizations approach, wherein individual optimizations are performed using a dynamic programming-based technique. The model predictions are validated against actual frequency data, with the results indicating a close fit to reality. We use the model to evaluate different strategic slot allocation schemes from the perspectives of the airlines and the passengers. The most significant result of this research shows that a small reduction in the total number of allocated slots translates into a substantial reduction in flight and passenger delays and also a considerable improvement in airlines' profits.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Engineering
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.1120.0412
