Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
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11098_2019_1358_ReferencePDF.pdf
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Author(s)
Builes, David(David Alan)
Date Issued
October 2019
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Builes, David et al. "Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief." Philosophical Studies 177 (October 2019): 3033–3049 © 2019 Springer Nature
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which ‘essentially indexical’ information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01358-1