14.129 Advanced Contract Theory, Spring 2005
Author(s)
Izmalkov, Sergei
Alternative Title
Advanced Contract Theory
Date Issued
June 2005
Abstract
This course focuses on recent developments in contract theory. Topics include: advanced models of moral hazard, adverse selection, mechanism design and incomplete contracts with applications to theory of the firm, organizational design, and financial structure.
Subjects
Games with Incomplete Information
Bayesian-Nash Games
Auctions and Mechanism Design
Static Models
Simple Models
Multiple Agents
Dynamic Models
Dynamic Adverse Selection
Dynamic Moral Hazard
Surplus Division
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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