The risks of key recovery, key escrow, and trusted third-party encryption
Name
paper-key-escrow.pdf
Size
260.54 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
2d5ee322be7948b78dd6cbe9e1675005
Author(s)
Anderson, Ross
Bellovin, Steven M.
Benaloh, Josh
Blaze, Matt
Diffie, Whitfeld
Gilmore, John
Neumann, Peter G.
Schneier, Bruce
Abelson, Harold
Rivest, Ronald L
Date Issued
June 1997
Journal
World Wide Web Journal
Publisher
O'Reilly & Associates, Inc
Citation
Abelson, Hal et al. "The risks of key recovery, key escrow, and trusted third-party encryption." World Wide Web Journal 2, 3 (1997): 241-257
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
A variety of "key recovery," "key escrow," and "trusted third-party" encryption requirements have been suggested in recent years by government agencies seeking to conduct covert surveillance within the changing environments brought about by new technologies. This report
examines the fundamental properties of these requirements and attempts to outline the technical risks, costs, and implications of deploying systems that provide government access to encryption keys.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Information Services and Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Computer Science
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=275104
