Position Auctions with Consumer Search
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position24QJE.pdf
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322.18 KB
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Author(s)
Athey, Susan
Ellison, Glenn
Date Issued
2011
Journal
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Harvard University by the MIT Press
Citation
Athey, Susan and Glenn Ellison."Position Auctions with Consumer Search." Quarterly Journal of Economics (2011) 126 (3): 1213-1270.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on
a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming
from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about rm qualities
and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare
benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
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DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr028
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr028
