Whanaungatanga: Sybil-proof routing with social networks
Author(s)
Lesniewski-Laas, Chris
Kaashoek, M. Frans
Advisor(s)
Frans Kaashoek
Date Issued
September 24, 2009
Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-045
Abstract
Decentralized systems, such as distributed hash tables, are subject to the Sybil attack, in which an adversary creates many false identities to increase its influence. This paper proposes a routing protocol for a distributed hash table that is strongly resistant to the Sybil attack. This is the first solution to this problem with sublinear run time and space usage. The protocol uses the social connections between users to build routing tables that enable Sybil-resistant distributed hash table lookups. With a social network of N well-connected honest nodes, the protocol can tolerate up to O(N/log N) "attack edges" (social links from honest users to phony identities). This means that an adversary has to fool a large fraction of the honest users before any lookups will fail. The protocol builds routing tables that contain O(N log^(3/2) N) entries per node. Lookups take O(1) time. Simulation results, using social network graphs from LiveJournal, Flickr, and YouTube, confirm the analytical results.
Subjects
dht
security
sybil
overlay
distributed hash table
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported
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