Computational Complexity, Fairness, and the Price of Anarchy of the Maximum Latency Problem
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4447-03.pdf
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Author(s)
Correa, Jose R.
Schulz, Andreas S.
Stier Moses, Nicolas E.
Date Issued
March 5, 2004
Series/Report no.
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4447-03
Abstract
We study the problem of minimizing the maximum latency of flows in networks with congestion. We show that this problem is NP-hard, even when all arc latency functions are linear and there is a single source and sink. Still, one can prove that an optimal flow and an equilibrium flow share a desirable property in this situation: all flow-carrying paths have the same length; i.e., these solutions are "fair," which is in general not true for the optimal flow in networks with nonlinear latency functions. In addition, the maximum latency of the Nash equilibrium, which can be computed efficiently, is within a constant factor of that of an optimal solution. That is, the so-called price of anarchy is bounded. In contrast, we present a family of instances that shows that the price of anarchy is unbounded for instances with multiple sources and a single sink, even in networks with linear latencies. Finally, we show that an s-t-flow that is optimal with respect to the average latency objective is near optimal for the maximum latency objective, and it is close to being fair. Conversely, the average latency of a flow minimizing the maximum latency is also within a constant factor of that of a flow minimizing the average latenc
Subjects
System Optimum
User Equilibrium
Selfish Routing
Price of Anarchy
Approximation Algorithms
Multicriteria Optimization
Multicommodity Flows
Persistent DSpace Link
