Defending the Possibility of Knowledge
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10992_2013_Article_9282.pdf
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377.23 KB
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Author(s)
Kennedy, Neil
Date Issued
May 2013
Journal
Journal of Philosophical Logic
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Kennedy, Neil. “Defending the Possibility of Knowledge.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 43, no. 2–3 (May 5, 2013): 579–601.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
In this paper, I propose a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on ideas from Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985), Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994) and Kvanvig (Noûs 29:481–500, 1995). After examining the solution strategies of these authors, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which the derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation. The constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal positions. We will introduce a slightly modified syntax and semantics that will help underline this point. Furthermore, we will prove results about the consistency of verificationism and the principle of non-omniscience by model-theoretical means. Namely, we prove there exists a model of these principles, and delineate certain constraints they pose on a structure in which they are true.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-013-9282-6
