Levels of Reasons and Causal Explanation
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693966.pdf
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456.33 KB
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Author(s)
Skow, Bradford
Date Issued
December 2017
Journal
Philosophy of Science
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Skow, Bradford. “Levels of Reasons and Causal Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 84, 5 (December 2017): 905–915 © 2017 Philosophy of Science Association
Version
Final published version
Abstract
I defend the theory that the reasons why some event occurred are its causes. Many “counterexamples” to this theory turn on confusing two levels of reasons. We should distinguish the reasons why an event occurred (“first-level reasons”) from the reasons why those reasons are reasons (“second-level reasons”). An example that treats a secondlevel reason as a first-level reason will look like a counterexample if that second-level reason is not a cause. But second-level reasons need not be first-level reasons.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1086/693966
