Considering a US-Supported Self-Defense Option for Taiwan
Name
Considering a US-Supported Self-Defense Option for Taiwan.pdf
Size
587.57 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
9db578243860ff24006b3534a7cf3ec7
Author(s)
Glaser, Charles L.
Date Issued
January 2, 2025
Journal
The Washington Quarterly
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Citation
Glaser, C. L. (2025). Considering a US-Supported Self-Defense Option for Taiwan. The Washington Quarterly, 48(1), 187–204.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
There is wide agreement that Taiwan is the most dangerous issue dividing the United States and China. China believes Taiwan is part of its homeland, views unification with Taiwan as a core interest, and is determined to gain full control of the island. China continues to prefer peaceful unification, but explicitly retains the option of using military forces to achieve unification and seeks to use the threat of military force to strengthen its negotiating hand. Current US policy includes an ambiguous commitment to defend Taiwan if attacked or severely coerced by China—it leaves open whether and how the United States would respond. In addition, the United States provides Taiwan with weapons to improve its ability to defend itself. The United States is pressing Taiwan to deploy smaller mobile weapons that would increase the survivability and lethality of its forces; these forces would support a “porcupine strategy” that makes Taiwan harder to invade and conquer and would, at a minimum, provide time for US forces to arrive to aid Taiwan’s defense.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Security Studies Program
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2025.2478778
