Truth in explanation
Name
64703980-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
6.99 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
3ed5dce24f06fd1670bf118fa487db07
Author(s)
Nickel, Bernhard, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Advisor(s)
Edward J. Hall, Robert C. Stalnaker and Stephen Yablo.
Date Issued
2005
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
My thesis consists of three papers on truth and explanations in science. Broadly, the question I ask is semantic. Should the best account of certain bits of our scientific practice focus on the concept of truth? More specifically, should the crucial distinctions between good and bad aspects of that practice be drawn in terms of truth? My thesis consists of three case studies: ceteris paribus laws in the special sciences, appeals to idealizations in the application of theories, and the analysis of explanations quite generally, exemplified in the asymmetry of explanation. In each case, prominent philosophers have argued that a proper treatment does not focus on truth. In each case, I argue that truth should play a central role. And in each case, the issue turns, at least in part, on the connection between the scientific practice in question and explanations.
Description
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-163).
Subjects
Linguistics and Philosophy.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
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