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Local aggregative games
Name
7118-local-aggregative-games.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
443.66 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
1fe6cd5b910c35c7503bc6430662d99c
Author(s)
Jaakkola, Tommi
Garg, Vikas
Date Issued
2017
Citation
Jaakkola, Tommi and Garg, Vikas. 2017. "Local aggregative games."
Version
Final published version
Abstract
© 2017 Neural information processing systems foundation. All rights reserved. Aggregative games provide a rich abstraction to model strategic multi-agent interactions. We introduce local aggregative games, where the payoff of each player is a function of its own action and the aggregate behavior of its neighbors in a connected digraph. We show the existence of a pure strategy e-Nash equilibrium in such games when the payoff functions are convex or sub-modular. We prove an information theoretic lower bound, in a value oracle model, on approximating the structure of the digraph with non-negative monotone sub-modular cost functions on the edge set cardinality. We also define a new notion of structural stability, and introduce 7-aggregative games that generalize local aggregative games and admit e-Nash equilibrium that is stable with respect to small changes in some specified graph property. Moreover, we provide algorithms for our models that can meaningfully estimate the game structure and the parameters of the aggregator function from real voting data.
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Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://papers.nips.cc/paper/7118-local-aggregative-games
