Honesty via Choice-Matching
Name
aeri.20180227.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
521.6 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
6ee8056a836c6db469c739c81658f149
Author(s)
Cvitanić, Jakša
Prelec, Dražen
Riley, Blake
Tereick, Benjamin
Date Issued
2019
Journal
American Economic Review: Insights
Publisher
American Economic Association
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We introduce choice-matching, a class of mechanisms for eliciting honest responses to a multiple choice question (MCQ), as might appear in a market research study, opinion poll, or economics experiment. Under choice-matching, respondents are compensated through an auxiliary task, e.g., a personal consumption choice or a forecast. Their compensation depends both on their performance on the auxiliary task, and on the performance of those respondents who matched their response to the MCQ. We give conditions for such mechanisms to be strictly truth-inducing, focusing on a special case in which the auxiliary task is to predict the answers of other respondents. (JEL C78, C83, D81, D82, D83)
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/AERI.20180227
