Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
Name
Yildiz_Reputation without.pdf
Size
275 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
9be07728695e2dfe3f978cf6bfb94e29
Author(s)
Weinstein, Jonathan
Yildiz, Muhamet
Date Issued
January 2016
Journal
Theoretical Economics
Publisher
John Wiley & Sons
Citation
Weinstein, Jonathan, and Muhamet Yildiz. "Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games." Theoretical Economics 11 (2016), 157-185.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs, but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage payoffs. Then classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1893
